A day in the life of Steve

Sunday, 13 August 2017

I used to think I was a programmer who did "sysadmin-stuff". Nowadays I interact with too many real programmers to believe that.

Or rather I can code/program/develop, but I'm not often as good as I could be. These days I'm getting more consistent with writing tests, and I like it when things are thoroughly planned and developed. But too often if I'm busy, or distracted, I think to myself "Hrm .. compiles? Probably done. Oops. Bug, you say?"

I was going to write about working with golang today. The go language is minimal and quite neat. I like the toolset:

  • go fmt
    • Making everything consistent.
  • go test

Instead I think today I'm going to write about something else. Since having a child a lot of my life is different. Routine becomes something that is essential, as is planning and scheduling.

So an average week-day goes something like this:

  • 6:00AM
    • Wake up (naturally).
  • 7:00AM
    • Wake up Oiva and play with him for 45 minutes.
  • 7:45AM
    • Prepare breakfast for my wife, and wake her up, then play with Oiva for another 15 minutes while she eats.
  • 8:00AM
    • Take tram to office.
  • 8:30AM
    • Make coffee, make a rough plan for the day.
  • 9:00AM
    • Work, until lunchtime which might be 1pm, 2pm, or even 3pm.
  • 5:00PM
    • Leave work, and take bus home.
    • Yes I go to work via tram, but come back via bus. There are reasons.
  • 5:40PM
    • Arrive home, and relax in peace for 20 minutes.
  • 6:00PM-7:00PM
    • Take Oiva for a walk, stop en route to relax in a hammock for 30 minutes reading a book.
  • 7:00-7:20PM
    • Feed Oiva his evening meal.
  • 7:30PM
    • Give Oiva his bath, then pass him over to my wife to put him to bed.
  • 7:30PM - 8:00pm
    • Relax
  • 8:00PM - 10:00PM
    • Deal with Oiva waking up, making noises, or being unsettled.
    • Try to spend quality time with my wife, watch TV, read a book, do some coding, etc.
  • 10:00PM ~ 11:30PM
    • Go to bed.

In short I'm responsible for Oiva from 6ish-8ish in the morning, then from 6PM-10PM (with a little break while he's put to bed.) There are some exceptions to this routine - for example I work from home on Monday/Friday afternoons, and Monday evenings he goes to his swimming classes. But most working-days are the same.

Weekends are a bit different. There I tend to take him 6AM-8AM, then 1PM-10PM with a few breaks for tea, and bed. At the moment we're starting to reach the peak-party time of year, which means weekends often involve negotiation(s) about which parent is having a party, and which parent is either leaving early, or not going out at all.

Today I have him all day, and it's awesome. He's just learned to say "Daddy" which makes any stress, angst or unpleasantness utterly worthwhile.

| 1 comment.

 

So I did a thing, then another thing.

Thursday, 3 August 2017

So I did start a project, to write a puppet-dashboard, it is functionally complete, but the next step is to allow me to raise alerts based on failing runs of puppet - in real-time.

(i.e. Now that I have a dashboard I wish to not use it. I want to be alerted to failures, without having to remember to go look for them. Something puppet-dashboard can't do ..)

In other news a while back I slipped in a casual note about having a brain scan done, here in sunny Helsinki.

One of the cool things about that experience, in addition to being told I wasn't going to drop dead that particular day, was that the radiologist told me that I could pay €25 to get a copy of my brain data in DICOM format.

I've not yet played with this very much, but I couldn't resist a brief animation:

  • See my brain.
    • Not the best quality, or the best detail, but damn. It is my brain.
    • I shall do better with more experimentation I think.
    • After I posted it my wife, a doctor, corrected me: That wasn't a gif of my brain, instead it was a gif of my skull. D'oh!

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So I'm considering a new project

Saturday, 29 July 2017

In the past there used to be a puppet-labs project called puppet-dashboard, which would let you see the state of your managed-nodes. Having even a very basic and simple "report user-interface" is pretty neat when you're pushing out a change, and you want to see it be applied across your fleet of hosts.

There are some other neat features, such as allowing you to identify failures easily, and see nodes that haven't reported-in recently.

This was spun out into a community-supported project which is largely stale:

Having a dashboard is nice, but the current state of the software is less good. It turns out that the implementation is pretty simple though:

  • Puppet runs on a node.
  • The node reports back to the puppet-master what happened.
  • The puppet-master can optionally HTTP-post that report to the reporting node.

The reporting node can thus receive real-time updates, and do what it wants with them. You can even sidestep the extra server if you wish:

  • The puppet-master can archive the reports locally.

For example on my puppet-master I have this:

  root@master /var/lib/puppet/reports # ls | tail -n4
  smaug.dh.bytemark.co.uk
  ssh.steve.org.uk
  www.dns-api.com
  www.steve.org.uk

Inside each directory is a bunch of YAML files which describe the state of the host, and the recipes that were applied. Parsing those is pretty simple, the hardest part would be making a useful/attractive GUI. But happily we have the existing one to "inspire" us.

I think I just need to write down a list of assumptions and see if they make sense. After all the existing installation(s) won't break, it's just a matter of deciding whether it is useful/worthwhile way to spend some time.

  • Assume you have 100+ hosts running puppet 4.x
  • Assume you want a broad overview:
    • All the nodes you're managing.
    • Whether their last run triggered a change, resulted in an error, or logged anything.
    • If so what changed/failed/was output?
  • For each individual run you want to see:
    • Rough overview.
  • Assume you don't want to keep history indefinitely, just the last 50 runs or so of each host.

Beyond that you might want to export data about the managed-nodes themselves. For example you might want a list of all the hosts which have "bash" installed on them. Or "All nodes with local user "steve"." I've written that stuff already, as it is very useful for auditing & etc.

The hard part about that is that to get the extra data you'll need to include a puppet module to collect it. I suspect a new dashboard would be broadly interesting/useful but unless you have that extra detail it might not be so useful. You can't point to a slightly more modern installation and say "Yes this is worth migrating to". But if you have extra meta-data you can say:

  • Give me a list of all hosts running wheezy.
  • Give me a list of all hosts running exim4 version 4.84.2-2+deb8u4.

And that facility is very useful when you have shellshock, or similar knocking at your door.

Anyway as a hacky start I wrote some code to parse reports, avoiding the magic object-fu that the YAML would usually invoke. The end result is this:

 root@master ~# dump-run www.steve.org.uk
 www.steve.org.uk
    Puppet Version: 4.8.2
    /var/lib/puppet/reports/www.steve.org.uk/201707291813.yaml
    Runtime: 2.16
    Status:changed
    Time:2017-07-29 18:13:04 +0000
    Resources
            total -> 176
            skipped -> 2
            failed -> 0
            changed -> 3
            out_of_sync -> 3
            scheduled -> 0
            corrective_change -> 3
    Changed Resources
            Ssh_authorized_key[skx@shelob-s-fi] /etc/puppet/code/environments/production/modules/ssh_keys/manifests/init.pp:17
            Ssh_authorized_key[skx@deagol-s-fi] /etc/puppet/code/environments/production/modules/ssh_keys/manifests/init.pp:22
            Ssh_authorized_key[steve@ssh.steve.org.uk-s-fi] /etc/puppet/code/environments/production/modules/ssh_keys/manifests/init.pp:27
    Skipped Resources
            Exec[clone sysadmin utils]
            Exec[update sysadmin utils]

| 4 comments.

 

bind9 considered harmful

Tuesday, 11 July 2017

Recently there was another bind9 security update released by the Debian Security Team. I thought that was odd, so I've scanned my mailbox:

  • 11 January 2017
    • DSA-3758 - bind9
  • 26 February 2017
    • DSA-3795-1 - bind9
  • 14 May 2017
    • DSA-3854-1 - bind9
  • 8 July 2017
    • DSA-3904-1 - bind9

So in the year to date there have been 7 months, in 3 of them nothing happened, but in 4 of them we had bind9 updates. If these trends continue we'll have another 2.5 updates before the end of the year.

I don't run a nameserver. The only reason I have bind-packages on my system is for the dig utility.

Rewriting a compatible version of dig in Perl should be trivial, thanks to the Net::DNS::Resolver module:

These are about the only commands I ever run:

dig -t a    steve.fi +short
dig -t aaaa steve.fi +short
dig -t a    steve.fi @8.8.8.8

I should do that then. Yes.

| 8 comments.

 

I've never been more proud

Wednesday, 5 July 2017

This morning I remembered I had a beefy virtual-server setup to run some kernel builds upon (when I was playing with Linux security moduels), and I figured before I shut it down I should use the power to run some fuzzing.

As I was writing some code in Emacs at the time I figured "why not fuzz emacs?"

After a few hours this was the result:

 deagol ~ $ perl -e 'print "`" x ( 1024 * 1024  * 12);' > t.el
 deagol ~ $ /usr/bin/emacs --batch --script ./t.el
 ..
 ..
 Segmentation fault (core dumped)

Yup, evaluating an lisp file caused a segfault, due to a stack-overflow (no security implications). I've never been more proud, even though I have contributed code to GNU Emacs in the past.

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Yet more linux security module craziness ..

Thursday, 29 June 2017

I've recently been looking at linux security modules. My first two experiments helped me learn:

My First module - whitelist_lsm.c

This looked for the presence of an xattr, and if present allowed execution of binaries.

I learned about the Kernel build-system, and how to write a simple LSM.

My second module - hashcheck_lsm.c

This looked for the presence of a "known-good" SHA1 hash xattr, and if it matched the actual hash of the file on-disk allowed execution.

I learned how to hash the contents of a file, from kernel-space.

Both allowed me to learn things, but both were a little pointless. They were not fine-grained enough to allow different things to be done by different users. (i.e. If you allowed "alice" to run "wget" you'd also allow www-data to do the same.)

So, assuming you wanted to do your security job more neatly what would you want? You'd want to allow/deny execution of commands based upon:

  • The user who was invoking them.
  • The path of the binary itself.

So your local users could run "bad" commands, but "www-data" (post-compromise) couldn't.

Obviously you don't want to have to recompile your kernel to change the rules of who can execute what. So you think to yourself "I'll write those rules down in a file". But of course reading a file from kernel-space is tricky. And parsing any list of rules, in a file, from kernel-space would prone to buffer-related problems.

So I had a crazy idea:

  • When a user attempts to execute a program.
  • Call back to user-space to see if that should be permitted.
    • Give the user-space binary the UID of the invoker, and the path to the command they're trying to execute.

Calling userspace? Every time a command is to be executed? Crazy. But it just might work.

One problem I had with this approach is that userspace might not even be available, when you're booting. So I setup a flag to enable this stuff:

# echo 1 >/proc/sys/kernel/can-exec/enabled

Now the kernel will invoke the following on every command:

/sbin/can-exec $UID $PATH

Because the kernel waits for this command to complete - as it reads the exit-code - you cannot execute any child-processes from it as you'd end up in recursive hell, but you can certainly read files, write to syslog, etc. My initial implementionation was as basic as this:

int main( int argc, char *argv[] )
{
...

  // Get the UID + Program
  int uid = atoi( argv[1] );
  char *prg = argv[2];

  // syslog
  openlog ("can-exec", LOG_CONS | LOG_PID | LOG_NDELAY, LOG_LOCAL1);
  syslog (LOG_NOTICE, "UID:%d CMD:%s", uid, prg );

  // root can do all.
  if ( uid == 0 )
    return 0;

  // nobody
  if ( uid == 65534 ) {
    if ( ( strcmp( prg , "/bin/sh" ) == 0 ) ||
         ( strcmp( prg , "/usr/bin/id" ) == 0 ) ) {
      fprintf(stderr, "Allowing 'nobody' access to shell/id\n" );
      return 0;
    }
  }

  fprintf(stderr, "Denied\n" );
  return -1;
}

Although the UIDs are hard-code it actually worked! Yay!

I updated the code to convert the UID to a username, then check executables via the file /etc/can-exec/$USERNAME.conf, and this also worked.

I don't expect anybody to actually use this code, but I do think I've reached a point where I can pretend I've written a useful (or non-pointless) LSM at last. That means I can stop.

| 1 comment.

 

Linux security modules, round two.

Sunday, 25 June 2017

So recently I wrote a Linux Security Module (LSM) which would deny execution of commands, unless an extended attribute existed upon the filesystem belonging to the executables.

The whitelist-LSM worked well, but it soon became apparent that it was a little pointless. Most security changes are pointless unless you define what you're defending against - your "threat model".

In my case it was written largely as a learning experience, but also because I figured it seemed like it could be useful. However it wasn't actually as useful because you soon realize that you have to whitelist too much:

  • The redis-server binary must be executable, to the redis-user, otherwise it won't run.
  • /usr/bin/git must be executable to the git user.

In short there comes a point where user alice must run executable blah. If alice can run it, then so can mallory. At which point you realize the exercise is not so useful.

Taking a step back I realized that what I wanted to to prevent was the execution of unknown/unexpected, and malicious binaries How do you identify known-good binaries? Well hashes & checksums are good. So for my second attempt I figured I'd not look for a mere "flag" on a binary, instead look for a valid hash.

Now my second LSM is invoked for every binary that is executed by a user:

  • When a binary is executed the sha1 hash is calculated of the files contents.
  • If that matches the value stored in an extended attribute the execution is permitted.
    • If the extended-attribute is missing, or the checksum doesn't match, then the execution is denied.

In practice this is the same behaviour as the previous LSM - a binary is either executable, because there is a good hash, or it is not, because it is missing or bogus. If somebody deploys a binary rootkit this will definitely stop it from executing, but of course there is a huge hole - scripting-languages:

  • If /usr/bin/perl is whitelisted then /usr/bin/perl /tmp/exploit.pl will succeed.
  • If /usr/bin/python is whitelisted then the same applies.

Despite that the project was worthwhile, I can clearly describe what it is designed to achieve ("Deny the execution of unknown binaries", and "Deny binaries that have been modified"), and I learned how to hash a file from kernel-space - which was surprisingly simple.

(Yes I know about IMA and EVM - this was a simple project for learning purposes. Public-key signatures will be something I'll look at next/soon/later. :)

Perhaps the only other thing to explore is the complexity in allowing/denying actions based on the user - in a human-readable fashion, not via UIDs. So www-data can execute some programs, alice can run a different set of binaries, and git can only run /usr/bin/git.

Of course down that path lies apparmour, selinux, and madness..

| 2 comments.

 

Porting pfctl to Linux

Thursday, 15 June 2017

If you have a bunch of machines running OpenBSD for firewalling purposes, which is pretty standard, you might start to use source-control to maintain the rulesets. You might go further, and use some kind of integration testing to deploy changes from your revision control system into production.

Of course before you deploy any pf.conf file you need to test that the file contents are valid/correct. If your integration system doesn't run on OpenBSD though you have a couple of choices:

  • Run a test-job that SSH's to the live systems, and tests syntax.
    • Via pfctl -n -f /path/to/rules/pf.conf.
  • Write a tool on your Linux hosts to parse and validate the rules.

I looked at this last year and got pretty far, but then got distracted. So the other day I picked it up again. It turns out that if you're patient it's not hard to use bison to generate some C code, then glue it together such that you can validate your firewall rules on a Linux system.

  deagol ~/pf.ctl $ ./pfctl ./pf.conf
  ./pf.conf:298: macro 'undefined_variable' not defined
  ./pf.conf:298: syntax error

Unfortunately I had to remove quite a lot of code to get the tool to compile, which means that while some failures like that above are caught others are missed. The example above reads:

vlans="{vlan1,vlan2}"
..
pass out on $vlans proto udp from $undefined_variable

Unfortunately the following line does not raise an error:

pass out on vlan12 inet proto tcp from <unknown> to $http_server port {80,443}

That comes about because looking up the value of the table named unknown just silently fails. In slowly removing more and more code to make it compile I lost the ability to keep track of table definitions - both their names and their values - Thus the fetching of a table by name has become a NOP, and a bogus name will result in no error.

Now it is possible, with more care, that you could use a hashtable library, or similar, to simulate these things. But I kinda stalled, again.

(Similar things happen with fetching a proto by name, I just hardcoded inet, gre, icmp, icmp6, etc. Things that I'd actually use.)

Might be a fun project for somebody with some time anyway! Download the OpenBSD source, e.g. from a github mirror - yeah, yeah, but still. CVS? No thanks! - Then poke around beneath sbin/pfctl/. The main file you'll want to grab is parse.y, although you'll need to setup a bunch of headers too, and write yourself a Makefile. Here's a hint:

  deagol ~/pf.ctl $ tree
  .
  ├── inc
  │   ├── net
  │   │   └── pfvar.h
  │   ├── queue.h
  │   └── sys
  │       ├── _null.h
  │       ├── refcnt.h
  │       └── tree.h
  ├── Makefile
  ├── parse.y
  ├── pf.conf
  ├── pfctl.h
  ├── pfctl_parser.h
  └── y.tab.c

  3 directories, 11 files

| 3 comments.

 

So I accidentally wrote a linux security module

Friday, 2 June 2017

Tonight I read this weeks LWN quotes-page a little later than usual because I was busy at work for most of the day. Anyway as always LWNs content was awesome, and this particular list lead to an interesting discussion about a new Linux-Security-Module (LSM).

That read weirdly, what I was trying to say was that every Thursday morning I like to read LWN at work. Tonight is the first chance I had to get round to it.

One of the later replies in the thread was particularly interesting as it said:

Suggestion:

Create an security module that looks for the attribute

    security.WHITELISTED

on things being executed/mmapped and denys it if the attribute
isn't present. Create a program (whitelistd) that reads
/etc/whitelist.conf and scans the system to ensure that only
things on the list have the attribute.

So I figured that was a simple idea, and it didn't seem too hard even for myself as a non-kernel non-developer. There are several linux security modules included in the kernel-releases, beneath the top-level security/ directory, so I assumed I could copy & paste code around them to get something working.

During the course of all this work, which took about 90 minutes from start to Finnish (that pun never gets old), this online documentation was enormously useful:

Brief attr primer

If you're not familiar with the attr tool it's pretty simple. You can assign values to arbitrary labels on files. The only annoying thing is you have to use extra-flags to commands like rsync, tar, cp, etc, to preserve the damn things.

Set three attributes on the file named moi:

$ touch moi
$ attr -s forename -V "Steve"      moi
$ attr -s surname  -V "Kemp"       moi
$ attr -s name     -V "Steve Kemp" moi

Now list the attributes present:

$ attr -l moi
Attribute "name" has a 10 byte value for moi
Attribute "forename" has a 5 byte value for moi
Attribute "surname" has a 4 byte value for moi

And retrieve one?

$ attr -q -g name moi
Steve Kemp

LSM Skeleton

My initial starting point was to create "steve_lsm.c", with the following contents:

 #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>

 /*
  * Log things for the moment.
  */
 static int steve_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
 {
     printk(KERN_INFO "STEVE LSM check of %s\n", bprm->filename);
     return 0;
 }

 /*
  * Only check exec().
  */
 static struct security_hook_list steve_hooks[] = {
     LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, steve_bprm_check_security),
 };

 /*
  * Somebody set us up the bomb.
  */
 static void __init steve_init(void)
 {
     security_add_hooks(steve_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(steve_hooks), "steve");
     printk(KERN_INFO "STEVE LSM initialized\n");
 }

With that in place I had to modify the various KBuild files beneath security/ to make sure this could be selected as an LSM, and add in a Makefile to the new directory security/steve/.

With the boiler-plate done though, and the host machine rebooted into my new kernel it was simple to test things out.

Obviously the first step, post-boot, is to make sure that the module is active, which can be done in two ways, looking at the output of dmesg, and explicitly listing the modules available:

 ~# dmesg | grep STEVE | head -n2
 STEVE LSM initialized
 STEVE LSM check of /init

 $ echo $(cat /sys/kernel/security/lsm)
 capability,steve

Making the LSM functional

The next step was to make the module do more than mere logging. In short this is what we want:

  • If a binary is invoked by root - allow it.
    • Although note that this might leave a hole, if the user can enter a new namespace where their UID is 0..
  • If a binary is invoked by a non-root user look for an extended attribute on the target-file named security.WHITELISTED.
    • If this is present we allow the execution.
    • If this is missing we deny the execution.

NOTE we don't care what the content of the extended attribute is, we just care whether it exists or not.

Reading the extended attribute is pretty simple, using the __vfs_getxattr function. All in all our module becomes this:

  #include <linux/xattr.h>
  #include <linux/binfmts.h>
  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
  #include <linux/sysctl.h>
  #include <linux/ptrace.h>
  #include <linux/prctl.h>
  #include <linux/ratelimit.h>
  #include <linux/workqueue.h>
  #include <linux/string_helpers.h>
  #include <linux/task_work.h>
  #include <linux/sched.h>
  #include <linux/spinlock.h>
  #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>


  /*
   * Perform a check of a program execution/map.
   *
   * Return 0 if it should be allowed, -EPERM on block.
   */
  static int steve_bprm_check_security(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
  {
         // The current task & the UID it is running as.
         const struct task_struct *task = current;
         kuid_t uid = task->cred->uid;

         // The target we're checking
         struct dentry *dentry = bprm->file->f_path.dentry;
         struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(dentry);

         // The size of the label-value (if any).
         int size = 0;

         // Root can access everything.
         if ( uid.val == 0 )
            return 0;

         size = __vfs_getxattr(dentry, inode, "user.whitelisted", NULL, 0);
         if ( size >= 0 )
         {
             printk(KERN_INFO "STEVE LSM check of %s resulted in %d bytes from 'user.whitelisted' - permitting access for UID %d\n", bprm->filename, size, uid.val );
             return 0;
         }

         printk(KERN_INFO "STEVE LSM check of %s denying access for UID %d [ERRO:%d] \n", bprm->filename, uid.val, size );
         return -EPERM;
  }

  /*
   * The hooks we wish to be installed.
   */
  static struct security_hook_list steve_hooks[] = {
       LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_check_security, steve_bprm_check_security),
  };

  /*
   * Initialize our module.
   */
  void __init steve_add_hooks(void)
  {
       /* register ourselves with the security framework */
       security_add_hooks(steve_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(steve_hooks), "steve");

       printk(KERN_INFO "STEVE LSM initialized\n");
  }

Once again we reboot with this new kernel, and we test that the LSM is active. After the basic testing, as before, we can now test real functionality. By default no binaries will have the attribute we look for present - so we'd expect ALL commands to fail, unless executed by root. Let us test that:

~# su - nobody -s /bin/sh
No directory, logging in with HOME=/
Cannot execute /bin/sh: Operation not permitted

That looks like it worked. Let us allow users to run /bin/sh:

 ~# attr -s whitelisted -V 1 /bin/sh

Unfortunately that fails, because symlinks are weird, but repeating the test with /bin/dash works as expected:

 ~# su - nobody -s /bin/dash
 No directory, logging in with HOME=/
 Cannot execute /bin/dash: Operation not permitted

 ~# attr -s whitelisted -V 1 /bin/dash
 ~# attr -s whitelisted -V 1 /usr/bin/id

 ~# su - nobody -s /bin/dash
 No directory, logging in with HOME=/
 $ id
 uid=65534(nobody) gid=65534(nogroup) groups=65534(nogroup)

 $ uptime
 -su: 2: uptime: Operation not permitted

And our logging shows the useful results as we'd expect:

  STEVE LSM check of /usr/bin/id resulted in 1 bytes from 'user.WHITELISTED' - permitting access for UID 65534
  STEVE LSM check of /usr/bin/uptime denying access for UID 65534 [ERRO:-95]

Surprises

If you were paying careful attention you'll see that we changed what we did part-way through this guide.

  • The initial suggestion said to look for security.WHITELISTED.
  • But in the kernel module I look for user.whitelisted.
    • And when setting the attribute I only set whitelisted.

Not sure what is going on there, but it was very confusing. It appears to be the case that when you set an attribute a secret user. prefix is added to the name.

Could be worth some research by somebody with more time on their hands than I have.

Anyway I don't expect this is a terribly useful module, but it was my first, and I think it should be pretty stable. Feedback on my code certainly welcome!

| 3 comments.

 

Security is hard ..

Tuesday, 30 May 2017

3D-Printing

I continued to be impressed with local vendors, found on 3dhubs. I've had several more things printed out, including an "internet button", and some card-holders for Settlers of Catan.

The most recent print I had made was a collection of display cases, for holding an OLED display, as well as an ESP8266 device.

Unfortunately at the same time as I was falling in love with the service I discovered a glaring XSS attack against the site itself.

Anybody who viewed my profile page could have arbitrary javascript executed, which in some cases would actually disclose their private details - such as:

  • Their forename & surname.
  • Their email-address.
  • Their telephone number.
  • Their GeoIP details.

Discovering this took minutes, writing it up took an hour, and a month later it is still unfixed.

I've deleted my account.

| No comments

 

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